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FRIENDS WITHOUT BENEFITS:
CRIMINAL INSIDER TRADING LIABILITY
AND THE “PERSONAL BENEFIT” TEST
AFTER BLASZCZAK
Curtis A. French*
The U.S. Supreme Court established the “personal benefit” test in Dirks
v. SEC to determine whether a tippee assumed a fiduciary duty to not trade
based on or disclose inside information when a tipper breached his or her
fiduciary duty by improperly disclosing such information to the tippee. Under
the personal benefit test, a tipper breaches his or her fiduciary duty if the
tipper derives a personal benefit, either directly or indirectly, from disclosing
the inside information to a tippee. The Supreme Court provided examples as
to what constitutes a personal benefit, such as the tipper’s expectation of
reputational benefits that will lead to future profits, receiving a quid pro quo
from the tippee, or providing inside information as a gift to a relative or
friend. However, the examples provided in Dirks were too broad and left
other courts without a definitive answer as to how to identify a personal
benefit. The Second Circuit and the Supreme Court attempted to refine the
application of the Dirks personal benefit test in United States v. Newman,
Salman v. United States, and United States v. Martoma. This line of cases
culminated in the Second Circuit’s recent decision in United States v.
Blaszczak in which the Second Circuit declined to apply the Dirks personal
benefit test to securities fraud and insider trading claims brought under Title
18 of the federal criminal code. This Comment discusses the origins of insider
trading law in the United States and the subsequent development of the Dirks
personal benefit test, examines the effects of the Second Circuit’s decision in
Blaszczak on insider trading law, and recommends how the body of insider
trading law can move forward following Blaszczak.

* J.D. and LL.M. in Taxation Candidate, Northwestern Pritzker School of Law, 2022;
M.Acc., The University of Tulsa, 2015; B.S.B.A., The University of Tulsa, 2014. Thank you
to my peers on the Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology for your thoughtful feedback
and edits.
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INTRODUCTION
Federal courts and prosecutors have struggled to apply federal insider
trading law within the United States ever since the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) brought its first insider trading enforcement action in In
re Cady, Roberts & Co. (Cady, Roberts) in 1961.1 Insider trading is a form
of securities fraud prohibited under the general anti-fraud provisions of
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.2 Insider trading occurs
when an individual who owes a duty to not disclose or trade upon material
non-public information subsequently trades a security upon the basis of such
information or shares such information with a third party in exchange for
profit.3 Tipping, a particular form of insider trading, involves an insider (the

1
See generally In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961); Russell G. Ryan,
Opinion, Insider Trading Law is Irreparably Broken, WASH. POST (Jan. 27, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/01/27/insider-trading-law-is-irreparablybroken/ [https://perma.cc/5M7Q-U5GD] (arguing that “there has never been an actual law that
defines and prohibits insider trading” and that “the SEC bypassed the legislative branch
entirely” through its actions in Cady, Roberts).
2
Andrew N. Vollmer, A Rule of Construction for the Personal Benefit Requirement in
Tipping Cases, 11 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 331, 333 (2017).
3
Id. at 333–34.
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tipper) who shares material non-public information with a third party (the
tippee) who subsequently trades securities based upon the information or
shares the information with another third party.4
In response to such trading and information sharing practices, the SEC
sought “to promote fair trading markets for all investors,” beginning with its
insider trading enforcement action in Cady, Roberts.5 For a time, the federal
courts maintained a somewhat predictable body of law to impose insider
trading liability upon corporate insiders—those who breached their fiduciary
duty by trading upon material non-public information without first disclosing
that information—and upon corporate outsiders—those who received
material non-public information and subsequently breached their duty by
trading upon such information without disclosure.6 In Dirks v. SEC, the U.S.
Supreme Court introduced the “personal benefit” test to further clarify that
an insider’s disclosure of material non-public information would constitute a
breach of fiduciary duty if the insider will benefit from the disclosure.7
However, recent cases in the U.S. Supreme Court and the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit “have blurred the lines of liability for insider
trading.”8
On December 30, 2019, the Second Circuit issued its opinion in United
States v. Blaszczak,9 igniting criticisms that “insider-trading law [was]
irreparably broken.”10 In Blaszczak, the Second Circuit declined to the apply
the “personal benefit” test from Dirks 11 to securities fraud and insider trading
claims brought under Title 18, Section 1348 of the federal criminal code.12
The Second Circuit held that it would be improper to extend the personal
benefit test from Title 15 securities fraud to Title 18 securities fraud because
the underlying statutory purposes of the fraud provisions under Title 15 and

4

See id. at 334.
Stephen J. Crimmins, Insider Trading: Where Is the Line?, 2013 COLUM. BUS. L. REV.
330, 367 (2013).
6
See id. at 335.
7
Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 662 (1983).
8
Crimmins, supra note 5, at 330.
9
947 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2019).
10
Ryan, supra note 1.
11
See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 662 (1983) (holding that a corporate insider breaches his or her
duty by disclosing material non-public information in exchange for a personal benefit and is
therefore subject to insider trading liability pursuant to Section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934).
12
Blaszczak, 947 F.3d at 36–37.
5
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Title 18 are markedly different.13 The Second Circuit’s decision in Blaszczak
effectively “seized on a snippet . . . [of] legislative history . . . to overthrow
more than 50 years of insider trading jurisprudence.”14
Part I of this Comment discusses the statutory basis for federal insider
trading jurisprudence in the United States. Part II examines how the elements
of insider trading law and tipping scheme liability developed in the common
law. Part III identifies recent insider trading cases demonstrating how federal
courts struggle to apply insider trading law consistently. Part IV analyzes the
Second Circuit’s recent decision in Blaszczak. Part V recommends how
Blaszczak should be addressed.
I. THE STATUTORY ORIGINS OF INSIDER TRADING LAW
Legal academics and practitioners describe United States insider trading
law as “seriously flawed,”15 a “theoretical mess,”16 “irreparably broken,”17
and “extraordinarily vague and ill-formed.”18 Such criticisms stem from the
lack of a federal statute that “directly prohibits the offense of insider
trading”19 or defines the elements constituting insider trading offenses.20
Absent explicit statutory language prohibiting insider trading activity,
prosecutors typically bring insider trading cases under both the general antifraud provisions of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and
SEC Rule 10b-5.21 Section 10(b) provides:
13
See id. at 34–37 (“Section 1348 [of Title 18] and the [Securities] Exchange Act do not
share the same statutory purpose . . . [and] because the personal-benefit test . . . depends
entirely on the purpose of the [Securities] Exchange Act, we decline to extend Dirks beyond
the context of that statute.”).
14
Adam Pritchard, 2nd Circ. Ruling Makes Messy Insider Trading Law Worse, LAW360
(Jan. 27, 2020, 4:10 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1237586 [https://perma.cc/C69PUY5P].
15
Jill E. Fisch, Start Making Sense: An Analysis and Proposal for Insider Trading
Regulation, 26 GA. L. REV. 179, 184 (1991).
16
Alan Strudler & Eric W. Orts, Moral Principle in the Law of Insider Trading, 78 TEX.
L. REV. 375, 379 (1999).
17
Ryan, supra note 1.
18
Kimberly D. Krawiec, Fairness, Efficiency, and Insider Trading: Deconstructing the
Coin of the Realm in the Information Age, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 443, 443 (2001).
19
Donna M. Nagy, Insider Trading and the Gradual Demise of Fiduciary Principles, 94
IOWA L. REV. 1315, 1322 (2009).
20
Peter J. Henning, What’s So Bad About Insider Trading Law?, 70 BUS. LAW. 751, 753
(2015).
21
Mark D. Cahn, Elizabeth L. Mitchell, Theresa Titolo & Brett Atanasio, Insider Trading
Law Alert: The Second Circuit Clears the Path for Insider Trading Convictions Absent
a Dirks Personal Benefit, WILMERHALE (Jan. 7, 2020), https://www.wilmerhale.com/en/
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It shall be unlawful for any person . . . (b) To use or employ, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any
security not so registered, or any securities-based swap agreement[,] any manipulative
or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors.22

An examination of this language reveals that Congress likely intended
to prohibit a broad range of actions in cases where the act of trading of
securities would defraud investors. Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court held that
“Section 10(b) is aptly described as a catchall provision, but what it catches
must be fraud.”23 More recently, the Supreme Court stated that “Congress
enacted the Title 15 fraud provisions with the limited ‘purpose
of . . . eliminat[ing] [the] use of inside information for personal
advantage.’”24 Consistent with these intentions, Congress expressly provided
for administrative interpretations of Section 10(b) by authorizing the SEC to
issue rules to further define which schemes or behaviors may constitute the
deceptions and contraventions of public interest.
The SEC exercised its authority under Section 10(b) by promulgating
Rule 10b-5 to provide examples of prohibited actions. Rule 10b-5 establishes
both “civil and criminal liability for securities fraud” that can be pursued by
the SEC and Department of Justice respectively.25 Rule 10b-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person . . . (a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to
defraud, (b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or (c) To engage in any
act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or
deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.26

While Rule 10b-5 explicitly prohibits schemes to defraud,
misstatements and omissions of material fact, and deceptive or fraudulent
business practices, this language essentially mirrors the “catchall” language
used in Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act.27 This catchall
insights/client-alerts/20200107-the-second-circuit-clears-the-path-for-insider-trading-convictions-absent-a-dirks-personal-benefit [https://perma.cc/H6HU-W7W7].
22
15 U.S.C. § 78j (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
23
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 234–35 (1980).
24
United States v. Blaszczak, 947 F.3d 19, 35 (2d Cir. 2019) (quoting Dirks v. SEC, 463
U.S. 646, 662 (1983)).
25
Karen E. Woody, The New Insider Trading, 52 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 594, 615 (2020).
26
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2020) (emphasis added).
27
Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 234–35.
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language is ripe for judicial interpretation and contributes to the everevolving “common-law-like” body of federal insider trading law.28
As part of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,29 Congress enacted a new
securities fraud statute, Section 1348, under the federal criminal code of Title
18, which provides:
Whoever knowingly executes . . . a scheme . . . (1) to defraud any person in connection
with . . . any security of an issuer with a class of securities registered under . . . the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 . . . or (2) to obtain, by means of false or fraudulent
pretenses, representations, or promises, any money or property in connection with the
purchase or sale of . . . any security of an issuer with a class of securities registered
under . . . the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 . . . shall be fined under this title, or
imprisoned not more than 25 years, or both.30

The legislative history of Section 1348 reveals that Congress intended
to “supplement the patchwork of existing technical securities law violations
with a more general and less technical provision, with elements and intent
requirements comparable to current bank fraud and health care fraud
statutes.”31 Specifically, Congress used Section 1348 to overcome the
“technical legal requirements”32 of the existing “shortcomings in current
law” at a time when “Enron and [Arthur] Andersen were taking advantage of
a system that allowed them to behave in an apparently fraudulent
manner . . . [and] the regulators . . . were faced with daunting challenges to
punish the wrongdoers and protect the victims’ rights.”33
Despite Congress’s intent for Section 1348 to be more general than
previous securities fraud provisions, the language of Section 1348 is similar
to the language in Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. However, Section 1348 is
markedly different from Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 in one regard: Section
1348 may only be used to bring criminal securities fraud enforcement actions
while Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 can be used for both civil and criminal
securities fraud enforcement actions. Invoking Section 1348 in conjunction
with Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 can lead to confusing results at trial, as
evidenced by the Second Circuit’s recent decision in Blaszczak.34
28
Edward Greene & Olivia Schmid, Duty-Free Insider Trading?, 2013 COLUM. BUS. L.
REV. 369, 384 (2013).
29
See 15 U.S.C. § 7201. See also Pritchard, supra note 14 (explaining that SarbanesOxley was passed in response to accounting scandals at Enron and WorldCom).
30
18 U.S.C. § 1348 (emphasis added).
31
S. REP. NO. 107–146, at 14 (2002).
32
Id. at 6.
33
Id. at 5–6.
34
See United States v. Blaszczak, 947 F.3d 19, 36–37 (2d Cir. 2019) (holding that the
“personal benefit” test, as applied in Dirks to securities fraud enforcement actions under Title
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II. THE COMMON LAW DEVELOPMENT OF INSIDER TRADING LAW
Before discussing the impact Blaszczak will likely have on criminal
insider trading enforcement, it is necessary to examine how federal insider
trading law evolved by reviewing three notable insider trading cases: Cady,
Roberts,35 Chiarella v. United States,36 and Dirks v. SEC.37 Together, these
cases constitute some of the earliest instances of insider trading prohibition
enforcement and lay the foundation for the common law development of
insider trading.38 Chiarella clarifies when the duty to disclose or abstain from
trading upon confidential information, as introduced in Cady, Roberts,
arises.39 Dirks establishes the personal benefit test “to determine whether [an]
insider’s ‘tip’ constitute[s] a breach of the insider’s fiduciary duty,” which
became a primary issue in Blaszczak.40
A. THE PROHIBITION OF INSIDER TRADING: CADY, ROBERTS

Following the passage of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, insider
trading law went untouched for twenty-seven years until the SEC
commenced its first insider trading administrative proceeding in Cady,
Roberts.41 In Cady, Roberts, a director of an SEC registrant corporation
informed a securities broker of non-public plans to reduce the amount of the
next dividend payment before the corporation had announced such reduction
to the public.42 After learning this confidential information and prior to the
public announcement, the securities broker sold shares in the corporation to
avoid any potential losses associated with a decline in share price.43 The
actions of the corporate director and securities broker in Cady, Roberts
exemplify a classic tipping scheme where the director (the tipper) shared nonpublic information with the broker (the tippee) for the broker’s benefit.

15, Section 10(b), was not applicable to securities fraud enforcement actions under Title 18,
Section 1348).
35
40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
36
445 U.S. 222 (1980).
37
463 U.S. 646 (1983).
38
See Woody, supra note 25, at 603.
39
Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 232.
40
Dirks, 463 U.S. at 661; United States v. Blaszczak, 947 F.3d 19, 26 (2d Cir. 2019)
(“[T]he ‘personal benefit’ test established in Dirks v. SEC . . . does not apply to these Title 18
fraud statutes.”).
41
See Crimmins, supra note 5, at 349.
42
In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 908–09 (1961).
43
Id.
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In response, the SEC commenced proceedings to determine whether the
director’s sharing of non-public information and the broker’s trading
activities violated Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Rule
10b-5, and Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933.44 SEC Chairman Cary
began his analysis by stating that a primary purpose of both the Securities
Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 “is the prevention of
fraud, manipulation or deception in connection with securities
transactions.”45 Chairman Cary stated that each act contains “broad remedial
provisions aimed at reaching . . . deceptive activities, whether or not they
are . . . sufficient to sustain a common law action for fraud and deceit.”46
Such “anti-fraud provisions are not intended as a specification of particular
acts or practices which constitute fraud, but rather are designed to encompass
the infinite variety of devices by which undue advantage may be taken of
investors and others.”47
The SEC ultimately found that the securities broker violated Rule 10b5, holding that an insider possessing material non-public information has an
affirmative duty to either disclose such information or abstain from entering
into transactions upon the basis of such information.48 While Cady, Roberts
was not a criminal case, it plays a significant role in the history of U.S. insider
trading law as “one of the first cases cementing the prohibition against insider
trading.”49 Furthermore, the tipper-tippee relationship present in Cady,
Roberts would eventually inspire a redefinition of the element of duty within
insider trading law during the 1980s.
B. THE DUTY TO DISCLOSE: CHIARELLA V. UNITED STATES

During the two decades following the SEC’s decision in Cady, Roberts,
Congress did not enact any additional statutes prohibiting or defining the
elements of insider trading or tipping schemes associated with securities
transactions.50 However, in Chiarella, the Supreme Court attempted to
clarify when an individual owes a duty to disclose material non-public
information to the investing public or abstain from trading upon material nonpublic information.51 The defendant-petitioner in Chiarella had access to
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51

Id. at 907–08.
Id. at 909.
Id. at 910.
Id. at 911.
Id.
Woody, supra note 25, at 603.
See Vollmer, supra note 2, at 338–39.
See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 224 (1980).
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corporate takeover press release drafts through his position as a printer at a
financial press company.52 After discovering the identities of each target
corporation, and prior to any public announcement of such takeover attempts,
the defendant-petitioner purchased shares in each target and subsequently
sold those shares for a profit after the takeover attempts were publicly
announced.53 The defendant-petitioner was indicted and convicted on
seventeen counts of violating Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 and SEC Rule 10b-5.54 On appeal, the Circuit Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit affirmed all seventeen convictions.55
However, the Supreme Court reversed the Circuit Court on the basis
that “[t]he Court of Appeals, like the trial court, failed to identify a
relationship between petitioner and the sellers that could give rise to a
duty.”56 The Supreme Court argued that “[t]he party charged with failing to
disclose market information must be under a duty to disclose it”57 and that
“[n]o duty could arise from petitioner’s relationship with the sellers of the
target company’s securities, for petitioner had no prior dealings with them.”58
The defendant-petitioner “dealt with the sellers . . . through impersonal
market transactions” and was not an agent, a fiduciary, or a trusted party of
the sellers.59 Chiarella is significant to the evolution of insider trading law
because it establishes common law precedent incorporating the SEC’s
original emphasis on duty in Cady, Roberts. Chiarella effectively provides a
template for how various relationships may trigger a duty to disclose material
non-public information to the investment public or abstain from trading upon
this information.
C. THE PERSONAL BENEFIT TEST: DIRKS V. SEC

In the two years following Chiarella, the Supreme Court’s new
fiduciary relationship requirement precedent “created analytical difficulties
for the SEC and courts in policing tippees who trade on inside information”60

52

Id.
Id.
54
Id. at 225.
55
Id.
56
Id. at 231–32.
57
Id. at 229 (quoting Frigitemp Corp. v. Fin. Dynamics Fund, Inc., 524 F.2d 275, 282 (2d
Cir. 1975)).
58
Id. at 232.
59
Id. at 232–33.
60
Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 655 (1983) (footnote omitted).
53
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when “the typical tippee has no such relationships.”61 Therefore, in Dirks, the
Supreme Court attempted to resolve the issue of whether a tippee with no
fiduciary relationship violated Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 and SEC Rule 10b-5 by trading on non-public information.62
The defendant in Dirks worked for a brokerage firm and received a tip
that a corporation had fraudulently overstated the value of its assets.63 After
confirming the existence of fraud, the defendant shared this information with
numerous clients and other investors who subsequently sold their shares in
the corporation before the fraud was publicly known.64 After an investigation
and administrative proceeding, the SEC found that the petitioner aided and
abetted violations of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
and SEC Rule 10b-5.65 The SEC argued that “[w]here ‘tippees’—regardless
of their motivation or occupation—come into possession of material
‘corporate information that they know is confidential and know or should
know came from a corporate insider,’ they must either publicly disclose that
information or refrain from trading.”66 The Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia affirmed the SEC’s decision, stating that “the obligations of
corporate fiduciaries pass to all those to whom they disclose their information
before it has been disseminated to the public at large.”67
However, the Supreme Court reversed the Circuit Court’s decision on
the basis that the SEC’s theories of tippee fiduciary duty and liability
conflicted with the principles of Chiarella.68 The SEC’s position that any
tippee “who knowingly receives nonpublic material information from an
insider has a fiduciary duty to disclose”69 is inconsistent “with the principle
set forth in Chiarella that only some persons, under some circumstances”
would be subject to a fiduciary duty to disclose or abstain.70 While rejecting
the SEC’s position of what would essentially constitute strict liability for
tippees, the Supreme Court acknowledged that “[t]he need for a ban on some
tippee trading is clear” in order to prevent insiders from recruiting tippees to

61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70

Id.
Id. at 650–52.
Id. at 648–49.
Id. at 649.
Id. at 650–51.
Id. at 651.
Id. at 652 (quoting Dirks v. SEC, 681 F.2d 824, 839 (D.C. Cir. 1982)).
Id. at 657.
Id. at 656.
Id. at 657.
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trade securities on their behalf.71 The Supreme Court established that a
tippee’s duty should be derivative from the tipper’s duty, the tippee assumes
a fiduciary duty “only when the insider has breached his fiduciary duty . . . by
disclosing the information to the tippee and the tippee knows or should know
that there has been a breach.”72
To determine when an insider breaches his or her duty, the Supreme
Court adopted a test under which an insider’s disclosure of material nonpublic information will constitute a breach of fiduciary duty when the insider
will benefit, directly or indirectly, from the disclosure.73 The Supreme Court
based this so-called personal benefit test on Cady, Roberts, in which the SEC
argued that one of the purposes of the Securities Act of 1933 and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was to prevent the “use of inside
information for personal advantage.”74 Rather than define what constitutes a
personal benefit to the tipper, the Supreme Court provided general examples
such as the tipper’s receipt of cash, reciprocal information, reputational gain,
or some other quid pro quo from the tippee.75 The Supreme Court
acknowledged that to determine “whether an insider personally benefits from
a particular disclosure [is] a question of fact, [which] will not always be easy
for courts.”76 By applying the personal benefit test, the Supreme Court
reasoned that the insiders in Dirks did not breach their fiduciary duty by
providing information to the defendant because the insiders did not receive
“monetary or personal benefit” in exchange for the information.77 With no
insider breach of fiduciary duty, the Supreme Court held that there could be
no derivative breach of duty by the defendant.78
III. RECENT APPLICATIONS OF THE PERSONAL BENEFIT TEST
The personal benefit test in Dirks altered insider trading law by creating
a new category of would-be defendants, but the Supreme Court’s vague
description of a personal benefit ultimately left courts confused.79 How could
a court find the existence of a personal benefit without a clear definition of
71

Id. at 659.
Id. at 660.
73
Id. at 662.
74
Id. (citation omitted).
75
Id. at 663–64.
76
Id. at 664.
77
Id. at 666–67.
78
Id. at 667.
79
Sari Rosenfeld, The Ever-Changing Scope of Insider Trading Liability for Tippees in
the Second Circuit, 8 MICH. BUS. & ENTREPRENEURIAL L. REV. 403, 407 (2019).
72
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what constitutes a personal benefit? For this reason, legal academics criticize
Dirks and the personal benefit test as being “a complete invention of the
Supreme Court with only a distant tie to Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.”80
Academics also maintain that Dirks was “far more legislative than the normal
outcome of a court using traditional tools of statutory or regulatory
construction to determine the meaning of a law,”81 in spite of the largely
common law evolution of insider trading law. Other academics argue that the
personal benefit test was merely an attempt to create an exception to insider
trading liability that would allow tippers to disclose inside information in
whistleblowing contexts where the tipper is motivated by exposing fraud
rather than seeking personal gain.82 In the aftermath of Dirks, a series of
recent cases emphasized the difficulties courts continue to face in applying
the personal benefit test,83 culminating in the Second Circuit’s controversial
decision in Blaszczak.84
A. UNITED STATES V. NEWMAN

The defendants-appellants in United States v. Newman were hedge fund
managers who obtained and traded upon earnings results for Dell and
NVIDIA prior to each company’s respective public earnings
announcement.85 The defendants-appellants received the non-public earnings
results through tipping chains that consisted of numerous financial analysts
who had received the information directly from various company insiders at
Dell and NVIDIA.86 Regarding the Dell tipping chain, the defendantsappellants were “three and four levels removed from the inside tipper,
respectively.”87 Regarding the NVIDIA tipping chain, the defendantsappellants were “four levels removed from the insider tippers.”88 The
defendants-appellants were criminally charged with violating Section 10(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act and SEC Rule 10b-5.89

80

Vollmer, supra note 2, at 341.
Id. at 340.
82
Woody, supra note 25, at 608.
83
See generally United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014), abrogated
by Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016); see also United States v. Martoma, 894
F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 2018).
84
United States v. Blaszczak, 947 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2019).
85
Newman, 773 F.3d at 443.
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Id.
81
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At trial in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York,
the defendants-appellants argued that they had no knowledge of whether the
tippers received any personal benefit for sharing the non-public earnings
results information and therefore could not have known about the insiders’
breaches of duty.90 However, the jury found the defendants-appellants guilty
on all counts.91 On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
reversed the defendants-appellants’ convictions on the basis that the
Government failed “to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [defendantsappellants] knew that the insiders received a personal benefit in exchange for
disclosing confidential information.”92 The Second Circuit reasoned that
“[t]o the extent Dirks suggests that a personal benefit may be inferred from a
personal relationship between the tipper and tippee . . . such an inference is
impermissible in the absence of proof of a meaningfully close personal
relationship.”93 The Second Circuit added that such a relationship must also
“generate[] an exchange that is objective, consequential, and represent[] at
least a potential gain of a pecuniary or similarly valuable nature.”94
Ultimately, the Second Circuit maintained that the government’s
evidence that the defendants-appellants had formerly worked with, attended
school with, and were family with some of the tippers was “simply too thin
to warrant the inference that the corporate insiders received any personal
benefit in exchange for their tips.”95 The Second Circuit’s “meaningfully
close personal relationship”96 requirement in Newman tipped the scales of
insider trading law in favor of would-be defendants by making it more
difficult for the government to infer that the tipper received the personal
benefit needed to establish tipper liability under Dirks. However, two years
later in Salman v. United States,97 the Supreme Court heard an appeal from
the Ninth Circuit concerning Newman’s requirement that a close personal
relationship must be accompanied by a pecuniary gain to satisfy the personal
benefit test established in Dirks.
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Id. at 452.
Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016).
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B. SALMAN V. UNITED STATES

The defendant in Salman received inside information from his friend
and brother-in-law, Michael Kara, who received the inside information from
his brother, Maher Kara, who worked as an investment banker at Citigroup.98
The petitioner was indicted, and ultimately convicted, in the Northern
District of California for violating Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 and SEC Rule 10b-5.99 Evidence presented at trial established
that Maher initially shared inside information to assist Michael financially,
but Michael subsequently shared this information with others, including the
defendant, without Maher’s knowledge.100 Michael also informed the
defendant that Maher was the source of the information.101
On appeal, the defendant argued that, pursuant to Newman, his
conviction should be reversed because there was no evidence that Maher
received a pecuniary benefit in exchange for sharing the information or that
the defendant had any knowledge of such benefit.102 In response, the Ninth
Circuit reasoned that a “tipper benefits personally by making a gift of
confidential information to a trading relative or friend” and therefore such a
tipping scheme satisfies the personal benefit test under Dirks.103 The Ninth
Circuit ultimately affirmed the defendant’s convictions by declining to
follow any additional requirements Newman imposed on tipping schemes
involving friends or family.104
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the defendant argued that “an insider’s
‘gift of confidential information to a trading relative or friend,’ is not enough
to establish securities fraud”105 because “a tipper does not personally benefit
unless the tipper’s goal in disclosing inside information is to obtain
money . . . or something of tangible value.”106 The Supreme Court rejected
this argument, maintaining that “Dirks specifies that when a tipper gives
inside information to ‘a trading relative or friend,’ the jury can infer that the
tipper meant to provide the equivalent of a cash gift”107 and therefore “the
tipper benefits personally because giving a gift of trading information is the
98
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same thing as trading by the tipper followed by a gift of the proceeds.”108 The
Supreme Court reasoned that such a situation occurred in the present case, in
which Maher breached his fiduciary duty to Citigroup by disclosing
confidential information to Michael with the expectation that Michael would
trade upon such information.109 As recipients of the confidential information,
Michael and the defendant therefore each assumed—and subsequently
breached—Maher’s duty by trading upon the information.110 Ultimately, the
Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s decision on the basis that
“Dirks makes clear that a tipper breaches a fiduciary duty by making a gift
of confidential information to ‘a trading relative.’”111
The Supreme Court next took aim at the Second Circuit’s decision in
Newman, stating that Newman’s requirement “that the tipper must also
receive something of a ‘pecuniary or similarly valuable nature’ in exchange
for a gift to family or friends” was inconsistent with Dirks.112 Specifically,
the Supreme Court maintained that Newman’s pecuniary gain requirement
for close relationships contradicted Dirks’ language that “the elements of
fiduciary duty and exploitation of nonpublic information also exist when an
insider makes a gift of confidential information to a trading relative or
friend.”113 Aside from rejecting the Second Circuit’s attempt to raise the
government’s hurdle in insider trading cases involving friends and relatives,
the Supreme Court’s decision in Salman was essentially a modern-day
affirmation of Dirks rather than a radical change in the existing body of
insider trading law.114
C. UNITED STATES V. MARTOMA

Less than one year after Salman, the Second Circuit reentered the fold
in United States v. Martoma to grapple with the “meaningfully close personal
relationship” requirement the Second Circuit imposed in Newman only three
years prior.115 The defendant-appellant in Martoma worked as a portfolio
manager for a hedge fund and was also responsible for recommending
108
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investments to other fund managers.116 The defendant-appellant began
trading and recommending the shares of two pharmaceutical companies
based on non-public information concerning the progress of various clinical
trials that the defendant-appellant received from paid consulting sessions
with clinical researchers.117 The defendant-appellant met with one researcher
approximately forty-three different times at a rate of $1,000 per hour and paid
another researcher a rate of $1,500 per hour for similar sessions.118
The District Court for the Southern District of New York convicted the
defendant on two counts of securities fraud in connection with insider
trading.119 On appeal, he argued that there was insufficient evidence that he
maintained a “meaningfully close personal relationship” with either tipper.120
Alternatively, the defendant-appellant argued that even if the evidence was
sufficient to support his conviction, the district court’s jury instructions were
inadequate in light of Newman because they did not inform the jury about the
limitations on a personal benefit.121 The defendant-appellant maintained that
Newman’s “meaningfully close personal relationship” requirement survived
the Supreme Court’s decision in Salman, and therefore the district court
should have instructed the jury that the existence of such a relationship was
a prerequisite for finding a personal benefit.122
The Second Circuit ultimately affirmed the district court’s decision,
rejecting each of the defendant-appellant’s arguments in turn.123 The Second
Circuit rejected the defendant-appellant’s insufficient evidence argument on
the basis that any quid pro quo relationship between a tipper and tippee could
“yield future pecuniary gain” and therefore “constitute[s] a personal benefit
giving rise to insider trading liability.”124 The Second Circuit reasoned that
in light of the defendant-appellant’s relationships with both researchers who
“regularly disclosed confidential information in exchange for fees,”125 “a
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime [of
insider trading] beyond a reasonable doubt.”126 Next, the Second Circuit
116
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rejected the defendant-appellant’s jury instruction argument on the basis that
“Salman fundamentally altered the analysis underlying Newman[] . . . such
that the ‘meaningfully close personal relationship’ requirement is no longer
good law.”127 The Second Circuit maintained that while Salman did not
expressly overrule the “meaningfully close personal relationship”
requirement, “the effect of a Supreme Court decision . . . may nonetheless
alter the relevant analysis fundamentally enough to require overruling prior,
‘inconsistent’ precedent.”128
Martoma was immediately controversial, raising concerns that now
“nearly any relationship would meet the standard of tipper-tippee for insider
trading liability”129 within the Second Circuit. The New York Council of
Defense Lawyers and a group of law professors filed amici briefs, claiming
that Martoma was an “over-extension of insider trading liability beyond
the Dirks standard.”130 In response to such criticisms, the Second Circuit
issued an amended opinion131 that shied away from its prior denouncement
of Newman’s “meaningfully close personal relationship” requirement.132 The
Second Circuit still affirmed the district court’s decision, but this time on the
basis that there was “compelling evidence” in the form of approximately
$70,000 of consulting fees that the tippers received a personal benefit in
exchange for sharing confidential information.133 The Second Circuit
maintained that since the evidence established a personal benefit, it need not
decide whether Newman’s additional requirements to establish a personal
benefit were inconsistent with Salman in the present case.134 By amending
Martoma, the Second Circuit quelled its critics for the moment. However,
the Second Circuit had also managed to kick the Newman can further down
the road by not actually deciding how the “meaningfully close personal
relationship” requirement should fit within the Second Circuit’s modern
insider trading jurisprudence, if at all.
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IV. UNITED STATES V. BLASZCZAK
A. BACKGROUND

Prior to Blaszczak,135 the Second Circuit’s analysis of the Dirks personal
benefit test generally pertained to civil and criminal insider trading actions
brought under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC
Rule 10b-5. However, Blaszczak required the Second Circuit to determine,
for the very first time, the extent to which the Dirks personal benefit test
applied to criminal insider trading actions brought under Section 1348.136 In
Blaszczak, defendants Olan and Huber worked for a healthcare-focused
hedge fund and ultimately traded upon non-public information from the
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid (CMS).137 From 2009 to 2014, Olan and
Huber received information concerning CMS’s potential rules and
regulations from defendant Blaszczak, a former CMS employee and current
hedge fund consultant.138 Blaszczak in turn obtained non-public CMS
information from defendant Worrall, a current CMS employee.139 The
defendants were charged with eighteen counts, including securities fraud
under Section 10(b), Rule 10b-5, and Section 1348.140
At trial, the District Court for the Southern District of New York
instructed the jury that in order to convict Worrall of securities fraud under
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, the jury must “find that he tipped confidential
CMS information in exchange for a ‘personal benefit[.]’”141 To convict
Blaszczak under the same provisions, the jury must find that “he knew that
Worrall disclosed the information in exchange for a personal benefit.”142 To
convict Huber or Olan under the same provisions, the jury must find that
Huber or Olan “knew that a CMS insider tipped the information in exchange
for a personal benefit.”143 Unsurprisingly, each of the district court’s
instructions concerning securities fraud under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
135
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required that the personal benefit test be satisfied pursuant to Dirks.
However, the court did not require the jury to satisfy the personal benefit test
when considering each defendant’s securities fraud charges under Section
1348.144 Rather, the court instructed that the jury could find the existence of
a scheme to defraud under Section 1348 if the defendants merely
“participated in a scheme to embezzle or convert confidential information
from CMS” for his or another’s own use.145 The court further instructed that
the jury “could only convict if it found that the defendant . . . knowingly and
willfully participated in the fraudulent scheme.”146 The jury ultimately
convicted Olan, Huber, and Blaszczak of securities fraud under Section 1348
and acquitted all defendants of the securities fraud charges under Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5.147
On appeal, the defendants argued that the lower court erred by not
instructing the jury that the Dirks personal benefit test also applied to
securities fraud under Section 1348, and therefore the personal benefit test
must be satisfied in order to convict.148 The defendants maintained that the
court should construe the term “defraud” to have the same meaning under
Section 1348 and Rule 10b-5 so as to make the elements of insider trading
fraud the same under each provision.149 Alternatively, the defendants argued
that declining to extend the Dirks personal benefit test beyond the securities
fraud provisions of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 would allow the
government to circumvent the personal benefit test altogether by merely
pursuing criminal insider trading actions under the lower hurdle of Section
1348.150
The Second Circuit rejected the defendants’ argument that the district
court erred in its jury instructions on the basis that it would be improper to
extend the personal benefit test to Section 1348 because the statutory purpose
of each securities fraud provision is fundamentally different.151 Beginning
with Section 10(b), the Second Circuit maintained that the personal benefit
test “is a judge-made doctrine premised on the [Securities] Exchange Act’s
statutory purpose.”152 The Second Circuit reasoned that Congress enacted the
144
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securities fraud provisions under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 “to
protect the free flow of information into the securities markets” by
“eliminat[ing] [the] use of inside information for personal advantage.” 153
Further, it reasoned that since the Dirks “personal benefit” test was intended
to be consistent with the purpose of the securities fraud provisions, the
purpose of the personal benefit test must be to prevent the use of inside
information for personal advantage.154 In contrast, the Second Circuit
maintained that “Congress intended for Section 1348 to ‘supplement the
patchwork of existing technical securities law violations with a more general
and less technical provision, with elements and intent requirements
comparable to current bank fraud and health care fraud statutes.’”155 The
Second Circuit ultimately held that since Congress intended for the securities
fraud provisions of Section 1348 to be more broad than the existing
provisions under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, applying the Dirks personal
benefit test would undermine the intent of Section 1348.156 Additionally, the
Second Circuit rejected the defendant’s alternative argument that failing to
apply the personal benefit test to securities fraud actions under Section 1348
would undermine Section 10(b) on the basis that “Congress was certainly
authorized to enact a broader securities fraud provision, and it is not the place
of courts to check that decision on policy grounds.”157
B. RESPONSES TO BLASZCZAK

In response to the Second Circuit’s decision in Blaszczak, defendants
Olan and Huber filed a joint petition for a rehearing en banc.158 Olan and
Huber argued that the Second Circuit “upended insider trading law by
eliminating the personal-benefit requirement for cases brought under Title
18.”159 They maintained that “[c]ourts, prosecutors, and market participants”
recognize the personal benefit test as “the boundary between innocent and
fraudulent trading, no matter which fraud statute prosecutors charge.”160
They also claimed that the Second Circuit’s distinction between the statutory
purpose of Section 10(b) and Section 1348 ignores not only the text of each
153
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provision, but also Dirks and other binding authorities providing “that
personal benefit is essential to proving insider-trading fraud.”161 However,
the Second Circuit denied the petition.162
Legal academics and practitioners echoed the defendants’ criticisms of
the Second Circuit’s reasoning in Blaszczak, maintaining that allowing
prosecutors to establish insider trading liability without first establishing a
personal benefit will place “careless employees, guilty of no more than oversharing,” at the mercy of an “over-zealous prosecutor.”163 These
consequences are not limited to employees, but would also likely apply to
“traders who stumble upon nonconfidential information . . . if they do not
track down its source.”164
From a policy standpoint, allowing the Department of Justice to
prosecute insider trading violations under Section 1348 that the SEC, using
the same facts, is unable to levy civil penalties against under Section 10(b)
“can hardly be what Congress intended when it adopted Section 1348.”165
The Second Circuit should have realized that allowing criminal charges to
proceed when civil liabilities cannot is absurd, especially given the different
burdens of proof required for criminal and civil liability.166 For example, how
can the same evidence establish criminal insider trading liability beyond a
reasonable doubt, yet fail to establish a more likely than not civil insider
trading liability? Such a possibility raises additional policy questions
regarding the respective roles that criminal and civil insider trading liability
each play in deterring certain behaviors.
Would-be defendants should be particularly concerned that Blaszczak
effectively provides “a potentially simpler path to conviction for prosecutors
in tipping cases where the evidence of a personal benefit is thin.”167 By
increasing the likelihood of bringing successful criminal insider trading
charges, Blaszczak essentially places the SEC’s regulatory oversight to
pursue civil insider trading charges under Section 10(b) into the hands of
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federal prosecutors who now have a lower hurdle to bring criminal insider
trading charges under Section 1348.168
Legal practitioners also suggest that, since the non-public information
at issue in Blaszczak originated within a government agency,169 the Second
Circuit’s holding may extend criminal insider trading liability “to those who
may be privy to and act on a regulator’s deliberations or other agency
information that has not yet been publicly released.”170 Specifically,
Blaszczak “could have significant implications for hedge funds, investment
advisers, healthcare systems and pharmaceutical companies, as well as
consulting firms handling health, financial, environmental and transportation
issues—any entity or individual receiving information originating from a
government agency that may be nonpublic.”171 In other words, the loosened
criminal insider trading liability rules could place government employees at
risk of committing criminal insider trading activities if the personal benefit
test no longer has to be satisfied when non-public government information is
communicated to another individual.172
This situation raises another policy concern: government employees
who may regularly have to share confidential information with agencies or
other government officials as part of their employment could now be found
criminally liable under Blaszczak if the recipient of such information trades
upon that information.173 Does it make sense to hold government employees
criminally liable for sharing confidential information with other government
employees, when the sharer of the information had no knowledge that
recipient was going to the use the information for their own personal benefit?
Surely the Second Circuit would acknowledge that such a result is an
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unintended, absurd result of striking down the personal benefit test under
Blaszczak?
Or perhaps the Second Circuit willfully disregards policy considerations
altogether. The Second Circuit indicated as much in Blaszczak while stating
that “it is not the place of courts to check that decision on policy grounds.”174
The Second Circuit may also be trying to distance itself from policy-focused
holdings to avoid encroaching on the legislative authority of Congress to
consider policy issues when drafting and adopting legislation. However,
given that current insider trading has evolved beyond its statutory origins into
a mostly common law body of law, the Second Circuit should not ignore
policy concerns, especially given that Congress has yet to enact a revised,
exclusive statute codifying the elements of criminal insider trading liability.
C. SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS

On September 4, 2020, defendants Olan and Huber petitioned the
Supreme Court for certiorari regarding the Second Circuit’s decision in
Blaszczak.175 Blaszczak filed his own petition for certiorari containing similar
arguments.176 The Office of the Solicitor General then filed a memorandum
with the Supreme Court stating that “[a] remand is appropriate under the
circumstances, because it would allow the court of appeals to consider the
issue in a different posture and to provide a written decision that addresses”177
the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Kelly v. United States.178 In December
2020, Olan and Huber filed a brief in response requesting that the Supreme
Court either grant a summary reversal of the Second Circuit’s decision in
Blaszczak or grant certiorari to allow the case to be heard before the Supreme
Court.179 Olan and Huber argued remanding Blaszczak based on Kelly was
insufficient because regardless of whether the Second Circuit reached a
different conclusion based on the property issues in Kelly, the “court’s radical
174
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change to insider-trading law would remain unaddressed.”180 Olan and Huber
argued further that the Second Circuit may merely choose “to discuss the
personal-benefit [test] in a way that might be considered only dicta.”181 On
January 11, 2021, the Supreme Court, consistent with the Solicitor General’s
prior recommendations, vacated the judgement in Blaszczak and remanded
the case to the Second Circuit “for further consideration in light of Kelly.”182
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
On remand, the Second Circuit should deliver a new holding in
Blaszczak that applies the Dirks personal benefit test to criminal insider
trading charges brought under Section 1348. In keeping with four decades of
insider trading law precedent, the Second Circuit’s original decision in
Blaszczak acknowledges that the personal benefit test is appropriate when
determining criminal and civil insider trading activity under Section 10(b)
and SEC Rule 10b-5.183 By failing to apply the personal benefit test to
criminal insider trading activities under Section 1348, the Second Circuit
incentivizes prosecutors to pursue criminal insider trading charges
exclusively under Section 1348.184 If prosecutors do not have to introduce
evidence establishing that a tipper knew that sharing confidential information
with a tippee would result in a personal benefit under Section 1348, why
would prosecutors bother to do so under Section 10(b) and SEC Rule 10b5?185
By requiring a higher hurdle for criminal charges under Section 10(b)
and SEC Rule 10b-5 than under Section 1348, the Second Circuit’s original
decision in Blaszczak essentially rendered Section 10(b) and SEC Rule 10b5 ineffectual by “clear[ing] a path for the government to circumvent the Dirks
personal benefit test by charging [insider trading] tipping schemes
exclusively under Title 18’s securities fraud provision.”186 However, similar
arguments from the defendants were rejected in Blaszczak on the basis of the
Second Circuit’s reasoning that the personal benefit test would undermine
180
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Congress’s intention that Section 1348 provide a broader anti-fraud provision
than Section 10(b) and SEC Rule 10b-5.187 While Congress may have
intended for Section 1348 to be a broader anti-fraud provision, it is unlikely
that Congress intended to prevent the application of Section 10(b) and SEC
Rule 10b-5 in criminal insider trading cases altogether. For example,
Congress did not include language identifying Section 1348 as the exclusive
statute governing insider trading activity. The Second Circuit also fails to
elaborate on what broader types of activities Section 1348 intends to
address.188 Blaszczak appears to rely upon the notion that the personal benefit
test should not apply to Section 1348 because Congress did not expressly
indicate that the personal benefit test should apply.189 The Second Circuit
could use the same reasoning to conclude that the personal benefit test should
apply to Section 1348 because Congress did not expressly indicate that the
personal benefit test should not apply.
The Second Circuit also held that the personal benefit test as applied to
Section 10(b) insider trading activity should not be extended to Section 1348
because Section 10(b) and Section 1348 have fundamentally different
purposes.190 The Second Circuit stated that the personal benefit test is a
judge-made doctrine designed to serve the purpose of Section 10(b), which
was to eliminate the use of inside information for personal benefit.191 From
this reasoning, it could also be inferred that the purpose of the personal
benefit test itself is to eliminate the use of inside information for personal
benefit by determining when knowledge of such personal benefit exists.
Therefore, it is likely that the Second Circuit failed to recognize that applying
the personal benefit test to Section 1348 insider trading activity would align
with the general anti-fraud purpose.
The Supreme Court’s decision to vacate Blaszczak and remand the case
to the Second Circuit indicates that the Second Circuit’s original reasoning
was flawed. Further, the decision in Blaszczak was the result of a 2-1 ruling,
187
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provisions prohibit . . . schemes to defraud” and “[w]hile the Title 18 fraud statutes and Title
15 fraud provisions . . . share similar text and proscribe similar theories of fraud, these
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and one of those judges—Judge Christopher Droney—who joined in the
majority opinion has since retired.192 Perhaps “the [Second Circuit] judges
should take the opportunity to restore insider trading law to the limits
imposed by the Supreme Court, unless and until Congress changes those
limits.”193 Interestingly, the Supreme Court’s decision to vacate and remand
the Second Circuit’s original decision in Blaszczak still provides an
opportunity for the losing party to appeal the Second Circuit’s new decision
to the Supreme Court.194 Thus, the Second Circuit’s new decision upon
remand may not immediately clarify the confusion caused by the original
Blaszczak decision.195
If the Second Circuit fails to reach a different decision regarding the
personal benefit test, then the most viable solution would be for Congress to
enact additional insider trading legislation. This legislation must either
explicitly define the elements of criminal insider trading liability or identify
an exclusive governing statute to eliminate the confusion surrounding which
statute applies. Additional legislation could also shift the prohibition of
insider trading away from its administrative origins to law “written by actual
lawmakers.”196 Fortunately, the U.S. House of Representatives passed H.R.
2534, the Insider Trading Prohibition Act, on December 5, 2019 with “an
overwhelming bipartisan majority of . . . 410 to 13.”197 Legal practitioners
criticize the language in H.R. 2534 as being too broad, granting prosecutors
too much discretion, and expressly replacing the existing common law
insider trading framework.198 However, “any legislative definition of insider
trading would beat the prevailing muddle.”199 The Insider Trading
Prohibition Act currently sits with the Senate Committee on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs.200
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CONCLUSION
The Second Circuit’s decision in Blaszczak to not extend the personal
benefit test to Section 1348 insider trading actions remains controversial and
in need of remedy. Further, the Second Circuit’s original decision renders
insider trading charges under Section 10(b) and SEC Rule 10b-5 obsolete.
Blaszczak underscores that insider trading law within United States
desperately needs clarification by Congress. The Supreme Court’s decision
to vacate the Blaszczak decision and remand the case to the Second Circuit
does not immediately solve the problems created by the original decision in
Blaszczak. However, the decision to remand provides a new opportunity for
the Second Circuit to reach a different decision.
While the Second Circuit’s pending new decision in Blaszczak may
result in a more consistent application of the Dirks personal benefit test, such
a result is far from certain. Fortunately, a piece of new insider trading
legislation has cleared the U.S House of Representatives and currently sits
with the U.S. Senate awaiting further discussion in committee. Given
ongoing Senate negotiations regarding COVID-19 financial relief packages
and continued confirmation hearings for officials appointed by the Biden
Administration, it is unclear when new insider trading legislation will arrive.
However, it is possible that calls for insider trading legislation and
enforcement may increase as the transition from the Trump Administration
to the Biden Administration continues.201 For example, “[t]he number of
white-collar defendants charged per year declined an estimated 26% to 30%
from the Obama to the Trump era.”202 While this trend alone is not indicative
of how the Biden Administration will proceed, “[t]he new administration is
unlikely to share the same enforcement priorities and relatively businessfriendly orientation of Trump’s.”203 Therefore, white-collar enforcement
activity—including insider trading enforcement—and the prosecution of
corporate executives is likely to increase under the Biden Administration.204
However, given the unknown, precise legislative priorities of the Biden
Administration, the most expedient course of action would be for the Second
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Circuit to deliver a new decision in Blaszczak that applies the Dirks personal
benefit test to criminal insider trading proceedings under the anti-fraud
provisions of Section 1348.

